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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this study is to discuss reflective IR practices among Finnish publicly listed 
companies. Put more elaborately, the objective was to assess why the phenomenon of top 
management explicitly commenting on the market valuation – which was present during the 
latest financial crisis – is not a persistent and systematic part of the IR agenda of Finnish 
publicly listed companies. In addition, this study intends to draw a landscape of present-day 
IR and its value creation, and the role of regulatory authorities, independent equity analysts 
and recent regulatory updates in it. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A grounded theory method for the generation of arguable propositions for the basis of 
research motif is adopted. Following this method, theoretical sampling is chosen as the means 
of data gathering. Research data consists of semi-structured in-depth interviews with members 
of top management of Finnish publicly listed companies, independent equity analysts and 
regulatory authorities.   
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
It was found that the top management of a publicly listed company lacks on average 
professionalism regarding valuation and regulatory treatment of a public company’s equity, 
and lacks incentives to the inclusion of reflective IR practices to their agenda. Also, the top 
management’s attitudes towards regulatory authorities and recent regulatory updates 
significantly discourage any proactively oriented IR activities. Furthermore, the top 
management profession seeks to develop long term credibility in the investor community, and 
are found reluctant to risk this personal asset. Finally, the equity analysis profession is able to 
satisfy the investor community regarding the information asymmetry arising from the 
incentive misalignment in between the representatives of top management and investors, 
when weighted by pros and cons alongside the reflective methods assessed in this study.  
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on keskustella reflektiivisten menetelmiä - joita käytettiin osana 
suomalaisten pörssiyritysten sijoittajaviestintää esimerkiksi edellisen finanssikriisin aikana – 
käyttöä osana suomalaisten pörssiyritysten sijoittajaviestintää. Tarkemmin sanottuna, tarkoituksena 
on tutkia miksi johto ei avoimesti kommunikoi näkemystään johtamansa yrityksen pääoman 
markkina-arvosta, sen muutoksista ja niiden syistä esimerkiksi pörssitiedotteiden muodossa. 
Lisäksi tämä tutkimus pyrkii kartoittamaan nykypäivän Suomen julkisten yritysten sääntelyn tilaa, 
pääoma-analyytikoiden roolia tässä sääntely-ympäristössä sekä arvioimaan ns. ohjeistusvelvoitteen 
päivitysten vaikutuksia sijoittajaviestintään ja sen arvontuotantoon. 
DATA JA METODOLOGIA 
Tutkimus soveltaa ankkuroidun teorian tutkimusmenetelmää tuottaakseen tutkimuskysymyksen 
selvittämisen tueksi teoreettisia propositioita analysoimalla ja abstrahoimalla tutkimusdataa. Tässä 
tutkimusmenetelmässä sovelletaan teoreettisen otannan aineistonhankintamenetelmää, jossa 
tutkimusaineiston hankinta ja analysointi tapahtuvat iteratiivisissa sekvensseissä. Tutkimusaineisto 
koostuu puoliksi strukturoitujen haastattelurunkojen avulla tehdyistä syvähaastatteluista 
suomalaisten pörssiyritysten ylimmän johdon, pääoma-analyytikoiden sekä pääomamarkkinoita 
sääntelevien toimielinten edustajien kanssa.        
TULOKSET 
Pörssiyhtiön ylimmältä johdolta keskimäärin puuttuu vaadittava ammattitaito johtamansa yrityksen 
pääoman markkina-arvon määrityksen teettämiseen ja riittävän syvälliseen ymmärtämiseen, sekä 
kannustimet näiden asioiden kommunikoimiseen sijoittajayhteisölle. Ylimmän johdon varaukset 
sääntelyä kohtaan, ja tuoreimmat pörssiyritysten tiedonantovelvollisuuksien päivitykset vaikuttavat 
heikentävästi ylimmän johdon sijoittajaviestinnän luonteeseen ja arvontuotantoon. Ylin johto pyrkii 
kehittämään pitkän aikavälin henkilötason uskottavuutta sijoittajayhteisön silmissä, ja on erittäin 
haluton riskeeraamaan tämän aineettoman pääoman. Tutkimuksessa todettiin myös, että pääoma-
analyytikoiden ammattikunta kykenee tyydyttämään sijoittajayhteisön tietotarpeet jotka nousevat 
informaation sekä kannustinten epäsymmetriasta yrityksen johdon ja sijoittajien välillä, ottaen 
huomioon vaihtoehtoisten, tässä tutkimuksessa käsiteltyjen informaation sekä kannustinten 
epäsymmetriaa vähentämään pyrkivien menetelmien hyödyt ja haitat. 
Avainsanat:  Sijoittajaviestinnän nykytila, Agenttiteoria, Analyytikoiden laumakäyttäytyminen, 
Arvopaperimarkkinalaki, Jatkuva Tiedonantovelvollisuus  
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1. Introduction 
Top management of a public company is, and should always be, in a position of knowing the 
future business prospects of a company they manage better than the financial community at 
large. The financial community, on the other hand, is better informed about the global 
economy and company’s competitive landscape, having the interim financial reports, stock 
market releases, top management presentations, and alike as only legitimate sources to 
company-specific information. Company management is responsible of making money out of 
company’s assets, as the financial community is responsible of maintaining a market 
valuation of the respective company’s equity, and both of these systems are noted to operate 
to a degree by their internal laws and by their intermediation. It can thus be acknowledged 
that a persistent gap of information exists in between the top management and the financial 
community, and it is also noted that very few studies address the optimal size and form of this 
gap, let alone its implications for regulatory authorities. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that 
as the motivation and prerequisites of the regulators and of the regulatory process – by its 
very purpose in securing the interests of stakeholders external to the company – is in 
necessitating the regulated companies to accommodate some additional practices – e.g. 
external reporting -, a critical assessment of those in the form of analyzed feedback from their 
practitioners should be carried out every now and then, as regulators can be thought of as 
necessitated to cause as minimal a degree of disturbance to conduct business as possible.  
Also, as the labor markets of both equity analysts and top management are found in previous 
research, as illustrated later in detail, to propose inefficiencies to market valuation, the idea of 
necessitating top management of a publicly listed company to maintain an independent 
valuation of company’s equity, and to be obliged to issue this valuation to the markets when 
found materially differing, should be addressed by an empirically oriented research conduct, 
as in this study.    
From regulatory and legislator perspective, publicly listed companies are responsible of 
continuously and without unnecessary delay informing the public on any information about 
the company and its business landscape that is likely to have a material effect on the 
company’s stock price (Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746, Chapter 6 4§). However the 
Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746 and the implied rules and guidelines say nothing about 
management having to inform the investors about management perceptions about the 
overvaluation, undervaluation or other misconception of company’s fundamental value in a 
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way that is likely to cause future under- or overvaluation or reduced or excessive liquidity, 
nor they explicitly state that management should ever do that. From the viewpoint of the 
regulatory authorities, the communication between the company management and the 
investors can thus be thought of as that of informing rather than discussing to ensure all 
market participants have all times an equal access to information of same volume and quality. 
In other words, regulatory authorities reserve the investors with a right to be consistently and 
persistently wrong, even if this results in a persistent and significant loss of company value in 
the form of e.g. arbitrary CEO replacement or missed opportunity cost, as company stock 
cannot be used as a lucrative financing instrument for e.g. mergers. Furthermore, it should 
also be according to the management’s self-interest to watch over and make effort in 
stabilizing the fluctuations of the company’s stock price, although they should instead focus 
on running the company. As company management can be thought of as imperfect agents 
who know the company’s future prospects better than the average investor at any given time, 
it can be hypothesized whether they should be encouraged or obliged and left with more room 
for application of the Ongoing Disclosure Obligation (ODO) of the Securities Market Act, 
even as this might also result in a loss of company value in the form residual loss depicted in 
and derived from the agency theory, as illustrated later in more detail.  
The intention of this study is to examine the constituents for the application of ODO as stated 
in Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746 and in the implied Rules and Guidelines laid out by 
Finanssivalvonta, a Finnish supervising authority responsible of supervising the application of 
Securities Market Act and harmonizing its practical implications with EU legislation and 
Directives, most importantly with Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on insider dealing and market manipulation (the Market Abuse Directive). The focus 
is placed on the possible material impacts resulting from the possible large-scale application 
of reflective communication practices – i.e. the practices of management publishing their 
views about the company’s stance in the equity markets – i.e. valuation -, as explained in the 
first chapter of this Introduction, in the form of e.g. stock exchange releases. It is to be noted 
that such practices have been used in extreme cases as during the latest financial crisis, but are 
at the present moment not habitually applied by top management of publicly listed companies 
in general.   
The motivation for this study stems from the notion that, given management applies the Rules 
and Guidelines - introduced later in more detail - exactly “by-the-book” it is likely to result in 
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persisting scenarios that destroy company value in form of e.g. arbitrary replacements of 
management, missed opportunity cost and persistent stock market miss-valuations and 
excessive or reduced liquidity; also the existence of IR strategies and alike marketing-oriented 
agendas of the IR function would be difficult to explain. Even further, from theoretical 
viewpoint, the agency theory and Jensen’s (1976) classical equilibrium - introduced later in 
more detail - let us assume that the company management acting as imperfect agents in the 
“separation of ownership and control” setting of a public company will reasonably apply the 
rules for their own protection and private benefit. On the other hand, given company 
management is explicitly given much freedom in informing the public about their perceptions 
of the market value of company’s stock, they may misuse their right to manipulate the stock 
price to e.g. make excessive money on their expanding stock options, or to simply extend 
their careers in a situation where they should be replaced, resulting in an equal or higher loss 
of company value than that implied by a schoolbook appliance of ODO. The theoretical 
grounds on top management’s IR agenda are thus highly ambiguous and to a great degree 
unexplored amongst financial studies, and very little empirical evidence exist to provide 
sound evidence on almost any of hypotheses and assumptions stated in this text so far. This 
might be due to the abstract and sensitive nature of the topic and the difficulties to obtain 
research data in a broad and systematic manner, as prevalent in financial studies. For the same 
reasons, a Grounded Theory approach is adopted as a research method, as explained later in 
more detail.  
The study is structured as follows. In Section 2 I state the preliminary research questions. 
Section 3 introduces the data gathering process and the research method. Section 4 continues 
by introducing the relevant theoretical and regulatory framework. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical findings of this study, and Section 6 concludes with a generation of substantive 
theoretical categories and propositions, and a discussion of their economic implications, 
implications for further research and the validity of research approach and its limitations. 
 
2. Research questions 
The research approach is adapted from the ideas of generating Grounded Theory known better 
in sociological research, organization research and management studies. Most importantly this 
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implies a tilted approach to a conduct of research as opposed to hypothetico-deductive 
approach that dominates in the field of financial studies; as I lay out the existing scarce 
theoretical framework before obtaining the data and analyzing it, the briefly introduced 
research questions are left with much room for the data to navigate the generation of theory, 
as explained later in more detail. Also, the data gathering is an iterative process, where 
previous step of data processing and analysis is allowed to navigate the course of research. 
Even further, following the grounded theory approach, the researcher does not usually make 
solid assumptions or formalize equations, propositions, hypotheses etc. a priori of data 
gathering and analysis, but should find these emerging from the data. Although the 
application of grounded theory is not pure in this study as I am compelled to adopt some 
propositions from the existing theory, the reader should take careful note of the fact that the 
intention of this study is as much in verifying the scarce practical implications of existing 
theory, as it is in generating new theory as emergent from data. To summarize, the stance 
taken towards the research topic and data is better described by asking “What is out there?” 
rather than following the more traditional means by asking “Are Propositions 1, 2, 3… n - as 
anticipated by existing theory and research - out there?”. 
What is meant by grounded theory generation in this study is, according to generic 
illustrations of grounded theory, the generation, discussion and ordering of concepts, 
categories and propositions attributable to behavior of management conditional on their 
relevant information set, as illustrated later in more detail. At this point, the main research 
question - the motive of this research - is formulated as follows 
What factors constitute the absence of reflective IR practices among Finnish publicly listed 
companies? 
A better term for reflective IR practices might arguably be self-reflective IR practices, but 
given the fact that an implied sensation of a Self of a company has long since been cast aside 
by distinguished schools of modern and postmodern organizational research, I chose not to 
adapt it. Thus, in this study, reflective IR practices consist of a set of management actions that 
by explicit means present the financial community with top management’s private views of 
the company’s present standing on the financial markets, most importantly stock price and 
liquidity of the company’s stock. By factors it is meant at this point in study a very wide array 
of prerequisites for managerial behavior, including conventional and culturally sensitive 
managerial professionalism, individual characteristics of the managers, state of regulations, 
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state and influence of external stakeholders to a company etc. etc. As the research progresses 
some of these factors are explicitly included in and omitted outside the scope of study. For 
clarity of scope it is to be mentioned that all subtle forms of management communication, like 
facial expressions, mood, charisma, or long-sustained credible status in the eyes of the 
investors are omitted outside the scope of this study. Although being very important, the focus 
of this study is chosen to address the explicit communicational practices that are thought of as 
being scalable, i.e. not dependent on the people presenting the company. Furthermore, even 
though actions like insider trading and buy-back of company’s stock are generally considered 
as strong signals of management perceptions about company’s market valuation, these – and 
all alike – indirect information signals are also omitted outside the scope of this study for 
clarity. In conclusion, although the reader may think of the topic as excessively narrow, a 
lengthy speculative discussion about the wide economic, managerial and regulatory 
implications of the reflective IR practices towards the end of this study is intended to justify 
the strict restrictions of scope.  
Furthermore, as the research motive can well be characterized as ambiguous, abstract, open-
ended and lacking clear and direct implications to adaptation of any well-defined research 
methods, it is indirectly approached empirically by a set of auxiliary research questions. 
These are revisited after the first round of interviews. At this point they are represented as 
follows: 
1. How could the information set that conditions the management’s conduct of IR 
practices be described? 
2. How can the communicational act between investors and company management be 
illustrated in general and at large? How the management perceives the value of  
a. One-way communication, such as e.g. stock exchange releases (informing the 
public at large, as necessitated by the Securities Market Act)  
b. public two-way communication, such as that in form of a Q&A session in 
public events like the road shows and Capital Market Days (CMD) 
c. private discussions with individual investors 
3. Is the potential loss of company value due to existing state and application of 
regulatory framework material enough to account for and acknowledged by company 
management, the investors and the regulatory authorities? 
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4. Do the management of the companies - especially the CEO, CFO and IR Director - 
make effort in trying to minimize this loss of value, and how? 
“Creation of company value” is here understood as a stable progression of company’s stock 
price according to a fair understanding of its future prospects and conditioned by the 
macroeconomic development, since this is likely the top management’s top priority. Thus, 
from the viewpoint of IR activities, company value can be created in situations where 
1. The management is successful in reducing arbitrary fluctuations of the company’s 
stock price 
2. The management is successful in reducing persistent over- and undervaluation of 
company’s stock price, or future prospects to those 
3. Investors are able to educate company management on company’s  whereabouts and 
managerial performance 
 
3. Data and Research Method 
The research data is obtained in anonymous one on one interviews with former and present 
CEO’s, CFO’s and IR Directors of Finnish publicly listed companies, and complemented with 
anonymous one on one interviews with stock market analysts and regulatory authorities. The 
interviewed managers are chosen to represent companies that likely had to deal with issues 
regarding information ambiguity, e.g. companies from the ICT sector and from turnaround 
and “valley-of-death” scenarios. The reader should note at this point that the empirical 
treatment is not linear in the fashion of collecting the data, then analyzing it and drawing 
conclusions, but iterative in the sense that interviews are conducted in various cycles, and data 
processed in previous section affects the content of interview in the next section.    
 
3.1 Sample formulation 
As justified later in more detail, the data gathering is a process that co-exists with the 
advancement of research. Interviews are held in multiple rounds, the research questions being 
iterated and discussed after each round of interviews until a point of saturation regarding the 
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focus of study is found. The stakeholders in the rounds of interviews are classified as follows, 
as later found emerging from the scarce existing research and theory. 
1. Past and present top management and IR Directors in Finnish publicly listed 
companies 
2. Regulatory authorities 
3. Independent stock market analysts  
The interview format is semi-structured; I will craft answer sheets for different stakeholders 
for the basis of interviews, but the intention is to leave much room for the interviewees to 
speak freely about the topic and directly offer ideas on the course of research. The semi-
structured question sheets are crafted after the data from previous round is processed. 
 
3.2 Methodologic approach 
Due to the abstract nature of the research topic and the unavailability to obtain unambiguous 
data in a systematic manner, a grounded theory approach is adopted in this research. 
Grounded Theory approach has been since its introduction in the 60’s the most widely used 
research approach in sociological sciences, where it was commonly noted towards 1970’s that 
the sociologists’  prevalent intention to verify existing theory rather to generate new theory 
often lead to biased interpretations and even biased sampling of the research data (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967).  
The first systematic and to this day most cited presentation of the Grounded Theory approach 
was presented by Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss (Glaser & Strauss 1967), and has 
since been adopted in a number of well-regarded studies in e.g. social, management and 
organizational sciences, as introduced later in more detail. The choice of approach is justified 
in this study by the lack of sustainable theoretical framework and previous research.  
Grounded theory approach is very different from traditional hypothetico-deductive approach 
most widely adopted in financial studies, where one first formulates hypotheses based on 
existing theory and research, and then empirically tests the validity of those hypotheses by 
most often quantitative data, finally drawing conclusions in support or against the hypotheses. 
With regards to grounded theory, the researcher does not formulate hypotheses or even vague 
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research questions a priori to gathering and assessing data – nor may the researcher even 
thoroughly define the data to be researched beforehand. Taken to its extreme, a researcher 
using this approach may even choose to omit a literature review and start off with a 
monologue about data gathering and analysis. As the approach nevertheless puts very high 
emphasis on the gathering and processing of data as the primary means of navigating the 
research, grounded theory can be thought of as very sophisticated and scientifically sound 
way of exploring areas of social behaviour where any theory has not yet been generated, or 
the researcher may assume that the existing theory may not be sound, the latter being the case 
in this study. It is also to be noted that the interest of this study is not in generating and 
comparable units of measurement, but in generation of attributable concepts, categories and 
propositions as prerequisites for social behaviour drawn from the data. Nevertheless the final 
aim is still on forming generalizations that serve a practical purpose and allow for predictions 
of behaviour, as illustrated briefly.  
Taken even further, as the interviews with managers and alike people may be uncomfortable 
for the interviewees and some might very likely bias their answers to some degree, and also 
my personal opt as an inexperienced researcher will likely have an effect on the gathering and 
processing of data, an elaboration on the nature of this research is to be made. As the 
gathering and processing of data is intended to navigate the course of research, and the nature 
of data is to some degree ambiguous – my interpretation of the different languages and 
subjective organizational realities of the interviewees who likely don’t always tell me the 
unquestioned truth, this study is compelled to take note of the limitations of the so called 
interpretive paradigm of the social sciences. The main notion of this paradigm is the 
ambiguity arising from the fact that the focus of research is not a common positivist reality 
nor even a social reality of a group of people, but my personal and also to some degree biased 
interpretation of a set of random subjective organizational realities of the interviewees.   
According to Glaser & Strauss (1967), a good presentation of grounded theory should   
1. enable the prediction and explanation of behaviour 
2. be useful in theoretical advance of the field of its respective studies 
3. be usable in practical applications in giving the practitioner understanding and some 
control of the situation to be assessed 
4. provide a perspective on behaviour – a stance to be taken towards data 
5. guide and provide a style of research to particular areas of behaviour 
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The application of grounded theory in this study is not pure, however, As I assume the 
practical implications of agent theory and theory of the company and the theoretical 
justification for the existence of IR function in publicly listed companies as a basis of 
research, thus to some degree making a priori assumptions or expectations on social 
behaviour.  The reader should note that the most important characteristic of grounded theory 
approach is in the stance taken towards data and the treatment of research questions as mere 
starting points to discussion – these can and should be neglected or iterated as per the 
conclusions drawn from the data. Also, even though some researchers (e.g. Dick (2007), 
Locke, 2001) argue for a grounded theory style of research that totally omits literature review 
and alike chapters, I chose to follow a more traditional structure of research as I found notions 
(Suddaby 2006, p.633) about grounded theory being highly sensitive to its historical context, 
which should also be explicitly introduced.   
Regarding the generic structure of a grounded theory, the following elements should be 
introduced. 
A slice of data is defined as an independent comment, argument, claim, guess, gut feeling or 
alike of the interviewee, which is processed as it may have implicit or explicit value for the 
purposes of generating theory 
A concept is the first-level abstraction from any number of slices of data. For example, when 
assessing managerial self-interest, if I come across with comments or alike that imply 
increased stress levels when engaging with investors, concepts of career concern, professional 
composure and personal safety may be drafted from slices of data.  
A category is yet a higher abstraction, generated by making comparisons of concepts, and 
identifying common attributes of those. For example, from the above concepts, a category of 
“maintaining professional composure in engaging with investors” could be generated, as 
slices of data imply increased stress levels, and the above concepts fall under the previous 
category definition. 
A proposition is a generalization made from a number of comparisons between categories. 
For example, given categories “maintaining professional composure in engaging with 
investors” and “engaging in discussion with the investors” emerge from the data, a 
proposition “Managers engage in discussion with investors more likely, when their top 
priority is not in protecting their professional composure.” This proposition may be justified 
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as one arising from the comparisons and identified relationships among categories, concepts 
and slices of data, and may also be tested in further interviews.  
In this study, I adopt a story telling mode when processing the data. The practical implication 
of this is that any propositions are made after each bulk of data is processed. 
 
3.3 Grounded theory in management research and organizational science 
The question of validity and necessity of somehow unique or well-adapted uses of grounded 
theory in the research of management sciences – i.e. if and how grounded theory could and 
should be made fit to the particular research domain – offers a good starting point for a brief 
introduction on the adoption of grounded theory in management research and organizational 
science. In her review of the topic, Locke (2001) notes that the vast majority of 
methodological references to grounded theory in management and organizational science are 
made to the Glaser’s original text published already in the 60’s. It has also been very common 
to mix grounded theory with methodologies of the respective domain or take its ideas to serve 
as a starting point and adapt them to a great degree. Locke (2001, p. 95-98) argues grounded 
theory being for research in the respective due to its ability to capture complexity (“produce a 
multifaceted account of organizational action in context”), link well to practice (“…ensuing 
theoretical accounts that this approach generates have proved especially useful to help 
organizational members gain a perspective on their own work situations.”), Support 
theorizing of 'new' substantive areas (“many of the features of managerial and organizational 
life associated with the revolutionary effects of technology are an obvious instance of such 
'new' areas of concern.”), and enliven mature theorizing (e.g. Parry (1998) argues that 
leadership be taken and researched as one of Glaser’s (1978) basic social processes, rather 
than as a construct of organizational setting.)   
Grounded theory has been applied to means of generating both normative and explanatory 
presentations in management studies and organizational research. As per normative research, 
Burgelman (1994) chooses to adapt a style of generating theory in the form on propositions. 
In his study of business evolution in the form of business exits in one of Intel’s business lines, 
Burgelman (1994) adapts a research methodology that resembles grounded theory due to his 
research topic having not been much researched in the past and theoretical base of it being 
underdeveloped. Grounded theory methodology is much adapted to something that 
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Burgelman (1994) calls a “longitudinal, two-stage, nested case study design”, still the 
research being grounded with respect to data acting as the basis for the generation of theory. 
Also the article presentation of research is much like that of a grounded theory paper, as the 
literature review and hypothesis formulation are left out and great emphasis is placed on the 
treatment and presentation of research data. The choice of theory generation in the form of 
normative propositions is most likely due to a sheer volume of unstructured data. In another 
field study, Burgelman (1983) adopts an even more formal application of grounded theory in 
presenting a process model of internal corporate venturing. In his explanation on the course of 
research, Burgelman lets the reader understand that his intention a priori was not to arrive at a 
formal process model, but to develop one as it seemed to arise naturally from the data. In yet 
another example, Lyles and Mitroff (1980) start off with grounded theory approach and arrive 
at a conceptualization of problem formulation in three typologies – i.e. the types of problems 
managers face. For a scarce example of a static theoretical model, Lee, MacDermid and Buck 
(2000) utilize grounded theory’s analytic techniques in investigation of the implications of 
reduced work load arrangements for hired professionals and managers.  
With regards to explanatory monologues in the research domain, Pandit (1996) adopts a very 
complex, inter-disciplinary and multi-faceted data collection process in its attempt to create a 
theoretical framework for corporate turnarounds. The compiled data set consisted of trade and 
business journal articles, newspaper reports, broker reviews, government publications, stock 
exchange releases and annual company documents of each of the companies presented in 
sample. A significant contribution to grounded theory in the research domain of business 
sciences was made in the way Pandit (1996) explicitly iterated his theorizing case by case as 
he analyzed through the companies, presenting the new means of acquiring new sources of 
data and making new kinds of interpretations from existing data. As the application of 
grounded theory need not be as explicit as in Pandit (1996) (Locke, 2001, p. 125), Isabella 
(1990) adopts a structure of research presentation where generated theory is presented upfront 
and the data is referenced here and there in supportive of theory unfolding. One benefit of this 
is to make the interplay of theory generation and data gathering and processing alive in the 
eyes of the reader, as they are thickly woven together. This form is also used by Eisenhardt 
(1989a) in a study of decision-making in fast-paced environments, as he generalizes 
propositions from theoretical categories of data as he observes the course of companies’ 
actions and nature of their decision-making in time.    
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Constraints to the adoption and adaptation of grounded theory in management research and 
organizational science is much related to issues of access to the data, ambiguity of data, and 
continuity of data access, and their implications to research design. Bulmer (1998) notes the 
practical challenges and possible causes of data ambiguity in establishing a data-gathering 
role in the organization, and moving across units in the organization, and Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe (1991) note the politics and ethical issues associated with research on 
management level in particular. One of grounded theory’s central features, the overlapping of 
data collection and analysis poses additional problems, as e.g. Barley (1990) illustrates how 
he stopped by his data gathering resort every now and then in no means to gather data but just 
to maintain credibility and continuity of research in the eyes of his connections, adding 
complexity and ambiguity to ethics of research conduct.   
Finally a note on the nature of this study’s research subjects, the top management of a 
publicly listed company. In this study, managers are thought of as agents acting conditional to 
their information set, which can be thought of as a set of fears, motivations, aspirations, 
knowledge etc. etc. which precedes management actions. It is hypothesized that the 
knowledge and attitudes on regulatory framework, past experience, observed behaviour of 
other managers and personal fears and motivations dominate this information set, as 
illustrated below. As managers conduct IR activities, they directly and indirectly collect 
feedback on their performance and assess their own behaviour, resulting in a change of the 
state of their information set. Although existing research on management psychology would 
allow us to hypothesize a set of internal relations for the main categories of this information 
set, I choose not to adapt any of such as it would be a very lengthy exercise of its own and is 
outside the scope of this study. Also it is to some degree contradictory to the ideas of 
Grounded Theory.  
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Picture 1. A Sketch Information System of the Managers’ 
 
 
Although similar information systems could be sketched for independent equity analysts, and 
regulatory authorities, these are omitted for brevity as they fall outside the intended scope of 
this study, the management’s application of Ongoing Disclosure Obligation and its 
constituents.  
 
3.4 Research design 
As mentioned previously, Grounded Theory approach does not validate the hypothetico-
deductive research design, but entails the researcher to come up with a mere framework of 
operational principles for conducting the research. For the purposes of this study, I chose to 
adopt a four-stage model suggested by Idrees et al. (2011) for conducting research on 
information systems, as this model is set to help novice researchers overcome the challenges 
arising from the adoption of Grounded Theory in research practice. Citing Idrees et al. (2011), 
the research design comprises of four stages:  
IR actions
Self-assessment and 
feedback
Personal fears, 
motivations, 
aspirations and
goals regarding 
IR and 
development of 
company value
Knowledge of 
boundaries and 
possibilities set 
out by 
regulatory 
Past 
experiences
Observed 
behavior of 
other managers
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(1) The uncertainty stage: where the primary focus emerges.  
(2) The emergence stage: where the core categories, which form the foundations of the 
theory emerge.  
(3) The ambiguity resolution stage: where the grey areas in the emerging theory are 
clarified.  
(4) The maturity stage: where the discussion of the findings against the literature takes 
place. 
 
Picture 2. Research design 
 
 
The generation of theory is most apparent in the emergence stage, which is initiated in this 
study after the first round of interviews. During the uncertainty stage, which constitutes of the 
first round of interviews I approach the interviewees with an open mind and an open 
interview structure to be able to sketch their mental whereabouts regarding IR.  As literature 
review is conducted in length before conducting interviews, maturity stage is more a 
reflection of generated propositions against existing theory.  
The information system of the managers is in the core of research design, but interviews are 
also held with other stakeholders, as mentioned also previously and explained later in more 
Literature review
(maturity stage)
further investigation → saturation
(ambiguity resolution stage)
theory ←linking categories ← core categories ← categories 
← data collection and analysis
(emergence stage)
literature review → broad research question → initial data gathering → 
primary research question
(uncertainty stage)
theoretical 
sampling 
constant
comparative analysis
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detail. The purpose of this choice is to reflect information acquired in preliminary interviews, 
and also to acquire information that can be reflected back to the next round of interviews to 
achieve more credibility and expertise and inspire more discussion. The reader should note 
that the nature of this information is forward-looking rather than explanatory of the present. If 
the requisites of saturation, as conditional to the ambiguity resolution explicit in the research 
design, are not met in a round of interviews, the data gathering process will continue at the 
emerging stage, as depicted by an arrow in Picture 2. 
 
4. Theoretical and legislator framework 
In this section I introduce the central theoretical concepts and the way they have been studied 
with respect to the most important stakeholders of the company, as this study is concerned. 
Also, the relevant regulatory and legislator framework is presented in brief. 
 
4.1 Theory of the company 
To start off with an introduction on the theory of the company offers us a reminder and a 
clarification of the imperfection of the nature of the contracts among the company’s most 
important stakeholders. Jensen (1976) was the first to present a formal model of the 
company’s optimal capital structure, assuming the agency costs and the residual loss 
introduced by Berhold (1971), Ross (1973, 1974a), Wilson (1968, 1969) and Heckerman 
(1975). Although the intention was in the practical implications for the optimal capital 
structure of the company, it helps to explain why the separation of ownership and control - i.e. 
assigning the management to control owners’ assets although this will impose a persistent loss 
on the value of the company – is perfectly consistent with assumptions of efficiency, and also 
justifies assessing the level of freedom the management should be allowed in carrying out 
their task, the focus of this study. 
Jensen (1976) adopts a view on the company as a “legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a 
set of contracting relationships among individuals”, and rests the normative focus of contracts 
between the shareholders and company’s top management – i.e. the contractual means of 
reducing residual loss as introduced in agency theory. The formal presentation of this 
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optimum is omitted for brevity, since it is outside the focus of this study. With regards to 
theory of the company, we can be satisfied with the notion that such a widely recognized 
model which presents practical implications for an optimal capital structure in presence of 
separation of ownership of control and agency problems as presented by Berhold (1971), Ross 
(1973, 1974a), Wilson (1968, 1969) and Heckerman (1975), exists.  
For the purposes of this study, the following stakeholders are included in the nexus and their 
roles are assessed separately both theoretically and empirically, or just theoretically: 
1. Existing and potential shareholders 
2. Company’s top management 
3. IR  department of the company 
4. 3rd party financial service providers, e.g. independent analysts 
5. Regulator authorities 
6. Board of Directors 
 
4.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory still is one of the most controversial and debated theoretical vehicles in 
managerial research (Eisenhardt, 1989). It has been studied in a range of disciplines, including 
finance (Fama, 1980), economics (e.g. Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971), organizational behaviour 
(e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; Kosnik, 1987) and political science (e.g. Mitnick, 1986). Some 
researchers (e.g. Jensen, 1983) are convinced it has a lot of prominence in the establishment 
of a grand theory about organizations, while others (e.g. Perrow, 1986) call it trivial and even 
“dangerous”. Regardless of the debate surrounding agency theory, it contributes and keeps in 
academic awareness the notion of managerial self-interest to the theory of organizational 
research, as it is coming more topic than theory oriented (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The origins of agency theory go back to 1960’s and early 1970’s at which time Arrow (1971) 
and Wilson (1986) explored risk sharing among individuals or groups. Agency problem was 
noted to occur when co-operating parties had different divisions of labour and differing goals. 
The unit of study, which is still the focus of the theory, was the relationship between a 
principal and an agent, to whom the agent assigns work to be performed and assets to control 
in performing that work.  
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In general, agency theory has two important propositions, also highly relevant to this study. 
As Ross (1989, p.134) notes, the relationships these propositions depict are universal.  
Firstly, it notes that the goals, desires, perception towards risk etc. etc. of the principal and 
agent may significantly conflict. This is a commonly held assumption in financial theory also, 
as it is known that investors may diversify their risk as management cannot, and thus an 
asymmetry of information exists as managers who are likely to take less risk know more 
about the company’s future prospects than the investors do. Also the research on Mergers and 
Acquisitions has provided empirical evidence on the fact that CEO’s may seek to buy and 
consolidate other companies in the interest of increasing their power and overestimate their 
contribution in achieving merger synergies, thus destroying company value as opposed to a 
situation where investors would buy the stock of a respective company themselves in a way 
that the management of the respective entities remains separate (Haleblian et al, 2009). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) provide empirical support and motivation for the conduct of even 
complex contracts between the CEO and the shareholders on risk sharing in finding out that 
increasing the firm ownership of the managers helps in decreasing managerial opportunism, 
formally stated by   
Proposition 1: When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more 
likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
Secondly it is noted or preceded that it is difficult or costly for the principal to know what the 
agent is actually doing. Thus the quality and existence of information systems like 
competitive labour markets, the financial markets, IR department and Board of Directors 
should curb agent opportunism, as the agent observes these systems and realizes that they 
inform the principal whether the agent acts according to the interests of the principal. With 
respect to this notion, Fama (1980) described the informational effects of capital and labour 
markets, and Fama and Jensen (1983) assess the role company board plays in controlling 
managers’ behaviour. Put formally,  
Proposition 2: When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to 
behave in the interests of the principal.      
As the abovementioned propositions propose a loss on company value – i.e. residual loss -, 
the bulk of research most relevant to our study – the relationship between a CEO and 
shareholders of the respective company – is to a great extent highly normative and 
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mathematical in its attempt to formalize approaches for optimal contracts between the two 
parties.  
The formal treatment of agency problems, arising from the separation of ownership and 
control, was first introduced in financial theory by Berhold (1971) by the assessment of 
management’s profit sharing incentives. Berhold (1971) is a purely normative study in the 
sense it develops a basic approach for the analysis of incentive contracts. No qualitative 
assessment on the agency relationship between CEO and the shareholders exists in to my best 
knowledge, thereason most probably being the ambiguity of research topic and difficulties in 
obtaining data in a systematic manner. Thus the importance of this study. 
 
4.2.1 Agency theory and IR function 
The abovementioned Proposition 2 provides a theoretical justification and motivation for the 
existence of IR department in a publicly listed company as a means to increase transparency 
and allow the principal to be better informed on what the agent is doing, the primary motive 
being in the alignment of the interests of these two. This, however, might not seem to apply 
very well in practice since IR department, reporting to the CEO and perhaps represented in 
the management board, is far from an independent third party. On the contrary, IR can be 
thought of as a function that monitors the investors and serves the CEO and CFO in serving 
the investors better.  
Modern academic look on the IR tends to view it as a strategic communication function that 
has an explicit strategy of marketing the company and building good image to a selected 
investor audience. Hoffman and Fieseler (2010) interview and survey a relatively large 
sample of equity analysts to conclude that the overall quality of company’s communication is 
the most important non-financial factor in the assessment of a company, and continue with a 
notion that the achievement of overall good image in the eyes of the investors is a process 
over time, and may significantly help in collecting relevant input from the markets, dispelling 
rumors and false information and manage the financial community’s access to top 
management. Skinner (1994) researches the voluntary disclosure of bad news to conclude that 
these are often purely qualitative releases that achieve a significant negative reaction at the 
stock market. From the viewpoint of this study, it is noted that these can thus be used 
successfully by the management to ease fluctuations e.g. before earnings announcements, and 
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it is also anticipated that interviewees will confirm the use of such a practice. Skinner (1994) 
also emphasizes the purely legal motivations by the management to disclosing bad news 
voluntarily, as management can be held legally accountable for the improper conduct of IR. 
This is also anticipated to be confirmed by the interviews with top management, as introduced 
later in more detail.  
A separate, more recent branch of research assesses the role and uses of Internet in conducting 
IR activities and engaging with the investors. Earliest of these studies still relevant today, 
defined as starting from an era where practically all public companies have a home page but 
majority of these companies not yet using it to share interim reports and stock exchange 
releases, is to my best knowledge Deller et al. (1999), which also assesses a set of more 
advanced web tools like on-line chatting - which has gained much popularity in the form of 
conference calls found adapted by many publicly listed companies as of present times - to 
find that the use of Internet as an IR tool was very limited among publicly listed companies in 
the UK, US and Germany, but most prevalent in the US. In a more recent study, Geerings et 
al. (2003) study the use of Internet in the Euronext zone to find out that the French and Dutch 
use the Internet to its fullest relative extent - as illustrated by a three stage model - whereas 
companies in other Euronext countries are at the second stage of Internet Investor Relations 
(IIR). The second stage of utilization is here characterized by using Internet as a medium to 
present ongoing information about companies prospects, and to combine such information 
available at other Internet sources of the financial community, whereas the companies in the 
third stage utilize “the use of hyperlinks, the use of specific file formats, internal search 
engines, cookie technology, the possibility of changing the language in which the information 
is offered, and the possibility of downloading files.”  
There are also a number of survey studies that focus on assessing the investor demands and 
appreciations for a valuable IR function (e.g. Hockerts and Moir, 2004), which also shed light 
on the nature of non-financial data the investors consider when giving out recommendations. 
Also, Hockerts and Moir (2004) have assessed investor relations from the point of view of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to note the very different informational demands 
mainstream investors place on the companies they hold in their portfolios. Kasanen and 
Puttonen (1994), Puttonen and Kasanen (1995) and Puttonen and Sarkki (1996) have 
conducted three annual surveys on the topic of investor communications by a survey of 
Finnish equity analysts. Throughout the three studies, the results show that differences in 
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good quality conduct of IR between Finnish companies are large, although the development 
has been positive in general.  The results also place emphasis on the oral and even more subtle 
forms of communication and to credibility of management presentations. In a more recent 
study, Chang et al. (2008) studied the link between disclosure quality – measured in terms of 
reducing information asymmetry in general and among investors – and found out that 
companies that rank higher in terms of IR quality are rewarded with more analyst coverage, 
enhanced market exposure and institutional following. Information asymmetry as some 
investors holding public and private information of differing value, and some holding only 
public information. Reducing information asymmetry is thus an act of increasing public 
information to reduce the relative share of those investors holding valuable private 
information also, i.e. transforming private information to public information. Ranking is 
achieved by an indexing based on a checklist of IR activities conducted over the Internet, as 
Internet is thought of as being the most public medium for reaching investor audiences.  
 
4.2.2  The role of governance 
The view on governance from the viewpoint of Proposition 2 might be very old-fashioned in 
the sense that bulk of the latest research on corporate boards proposes they should have a 
much larger and active agenda, instead of just providing the CEO with strategic ends and 
supervising his/her activities. Mellahi (2005) notes how boards play a large role in situations 
of crossing the “valley of death” – i.e. very difficult times due to e.g. disruptive technologies 
– or in turnaround situations, and generalizes a few conditions by which the boards would be 
bound to fail in their task. Adams et al. (2010) review the present board agenda and find 
further evidence to the Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey that notes the fundamental 
intervene of board composition and board agenda, thus making it difficult to assess the 
actions of the “modern” board for none such generalization may exist. As the role of the 
board may vary from a simply legal entity which just says “Yes” to any idea of the CEO and 
fire him/her in case of bad company performance, to an active player in the overall 
management and control of the company, Adams et al. (2010) find no other material 
generalizations than controlling the CEO and holding him/her responsible, and maintaining a 
company strategy.  
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From the point of view of this study and Proposition 2 of agency theory, as introduced in 
Chapter 4.2., a recent study of Shank et al (2013) provides further support for the value of 
boards as part of the information system that notifies the principal on agent’s whereabouts. 
Shank et al (2013) research the correlation of corporate governance and risk-adjusted 
performance and find that good governance is correlated with risk-adjusted returns on the 
stock price in periods of three, five and ten years in small cap stocks of the US stock market. 
It is left unquestioned whether they would play the same role in mid and large cap stocks, if 
the investors had as good an access to interact with the board there. The reader may take note 
here that this ambiguity will be later addressed in interviews. Also, Collett & Dedman (2010) 
observe large share price movements and their correlation with stock exchange release or 
media coverage, they also document a link between better corporate governance and public 
corporate disclosure, thus providing further support for Proposition 2.  
 
4.3 Analyst labor market theory 
As many papers (Hirshleifer et al. 2001; Devenow and Welch, 1996; Brennan, 1990; 
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Cooper et al., 2001; Gleason and Glee, 2003), have illustrated 
the independent analysts’ labor market being imperfect, functioning under its own laws 
separate from the real economy and resulting in e.g. biased consensus forecasts, a few words 
should be written about that also, since it is close relationship with management behavior and 
interpretation of management communication. For example, under herding, intended results 
of a stock exchange release may be of significantly higher magnitude.  
 
4.3.1 Herding  
What is common to different definitions, forms and degrees of herding is that in all of them 
members of a group exhibit causal correlation in their behavioral patterns. As opposed to 
contagion, this behavior arises from voluntary actions by agents. Herding can occur in 
settings where agents of perfect or limited rationality possess private and differing or similar 
information sets, and expose them wholly or partially to others in their actions. These 
information sets may be different in amount, quality or character, and the actions of herding 
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individuals may be contradictory to the actions implied solely by their private information 
sets.  
Hirshleifer et al. (2001) identify three subsets to herding/dispersing by reviewing existing 
literature: 
 
(1) Observational influence occurs when private information is divided unequally among 
individuals, and agents are not certain of the quality of the private information of their own 
and of others. Though the outcome of this form of herding may be optimal to those who 
choose to herd, the individuals who neglect a part of their private information are not certain 
of the quality of the exposed information set they choose to follow, but assume it is of better 
quality than their own, since more than one agent implies it in their actions.  
(2) Rational observational learning occurs when an agent who chooses to follow the herd can be 
sure that her decision is based on information superior to her private.  
(3) Informational cascades form when the influence of others is strong enough to make an agent 
totally neglect her private information, and base her actions solely on observations of the 
behavior of others. In this category, imitation occurs with certainty and can be assessed 
beforehand. The signal of a cascading agent is thus uninformative of her private information.  
 
The above subsets refer inconsistently to forms of rational and irrational herding. Devenow 
and Welch (1996) who focus on rational herding in their review suggest that it occurs when 
individuals are able to observe the positive payoff externalities captured by following actions 
of other individuals. Rational herding thus occurs when an individual is certain that the 
observed action implies a superior or equal information set, or the average individual outcome 
is larger when more people choose the same action. Some of these situations found in e.g. 
Brennan (1990) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) include  
 
(a)  stock market participants adjusting their portfolios according to new information made public 
at the market 
(b) bank runs, where there is no cost of raising funds from bank, but a risk of losing them in case 
of insolvency 
(c) portfolio managers herding because of their evaluation and compensation is related to that of 
peers 
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(d) stock market participants neglecting to acquire costly information about small companies, 
when the usability of this information in trading depends on other participants acquiring it too  
Herding behavior can be further categorized to stabilizing or destabilizing based on its 
tendency to exhibit divergent or convergent process outcomes, as Wermers (1999) has noted. 
For examples, stabilizing herding is something that mutual funds engage in to bring prices to 
their fundamental levels, as destabilizing herding may be a result of e.g. volatility spillovers 
in between industries or stock exchanges.  
 
4.3.2 Analyst herding 
 In this thesis, analyst herding is defined as rational based on the observation that analysts 
who act as agents in a competitive labor market are in general able to observe the quality of 
the signal to which they choose to neglect a part of their private information, as found by 
Cooper et al. (2000). In more detail, it is assumed that their information sets are different in 
quality, making it possible to order them. Analyst herding can be categorized as rational 
observational herding in the process of consensus formation as explained later.  
Since analyst herding occurs as a result of actions by individuals in a competitive labor 
market, analysts’ choice to herd depends on maximizing private utility. This is twofold given 
an analyst is able to identify the relative quality or reputation of her signal. Weak analysts are 
thus likely to herd for protective purposes, as a common perception is that it is more harmful 
to make an incorrect assessment as an individual than as a member of a group. Strong analysts 
have on the other hand in their concern to avoid attracting consensus around them, since they 
do not want others to free-ride on their superior ability, but want the credit of their accuracy 
all for themselves. It is thus hypothesized in this study that signals that are issued early and 
attract consensus are likely biased, even though they come from analysts who have a bold and 
accurate reputation. This intuition is supported by empirical results of Gleason and Glee 
(2003), which focus on forecasts revisions, and find out that the most accurate signals are 
revised close to announcement dates.  
A very important empirical distinction is made regarding the information sets analysts use in 
forecasting and setting target prices. Information set of earnings forecasts is not assumed to 
incorporate expectations of a price discovery failure, but the target set of investment 
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recommendations is allowed to. Thus the information set used when forecasting earnings is a 
subset to that used in setting target prices. This assumption is verified in Gleason et al (2006) 
who find that more accurate earnings forecasters respectively set more accurate target prices. 
In this study, a clear line on the scope of study is drawn in between analyst’ labor and its 
above illustrated implications to forecasting biases and market price discovery, and to 
information system used by management to assess the likely impact of IR activities. Although 
it is likely that managers are to some degree aware of these biases, the active study of arising 
conditions and implications to price discovery failure are left unaddressed, although their 
impact might in some cases offset the impact of improper conduct of IR activities.   
 
4.4 Regulatory framework 
In this Section I introduce the relevant regulatory framework. I start off with a notion on the 
general hierarchy of legislative regulation (see Picture 1 below). Picture 1 represents the 
hierarchy and intermediation of regulations related to and surrounding Ongoing Disclosure 
Obligation (ODO), the focus of this study. As explained later in more detail, all Finnish 
legislation should exist and be practices in harmony with respective EU legislation, 
Finanssivalvonta having a particularly substantial mandate by the Ministry of State Treasury 
to update and oversee the compliance of guidelines and rules, which should be adapted by 
Finnish publicly listed companies. The reader should take careful note that – although the top 
managements and analysts’ feedback on the performance of the regulatory authorities is 
included in the agenda of this study - the assessment of this regulatory structure and its 
functioning is omitted for brevity, and the following chapters are to be read only as structural 
introductory, not as an introduction on the present state of regulatory affairs on domestic and 
EU level.  
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Picture 3. Hierarchy and intermediation of regulations 
 
 
  
 
4.4.1 Directive 2003/6/EC 
Directive 2003/6/EC, more commonly known as Market Abuse Directive (MAD), was to be 
implemented by all member states October 2004. Its aim was to harmonize the market abuse 
regime across in order to facilitate the creation of single European financial market.  
Directives are flexible legal instruments, i.e. only binding to the results to be achieved by 
them, leaving room for national diversity in implementation.   
With regards to the focus of our study - the responsibility of the company to continuously 
inform the investors of events likely material to its stock price - Directive 2003/6/EC very 
little of anything controversial to the Securities Market Act of 1989. Thus much of the old 
text was left untouched in recent reform. 
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4.4.2 Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746, Chapter 7 
The Securities Market Act was to large part reformed during the 2000’s and the finished text 
came in to force on 14.12.2012. The motivation of the reform was to increase the internal 
consistency of the text, and consistency with EU legislation and regulations. The sections 
relevant to this study - Chapter 7 - were however largely sustained in the form they are 
written in Securities Market Act 26.5.1989/495. As no official English is available to my best 
knowledge, the translations are my own.  
The bulk of the Chapter 7 is uninteresting for the focus of this study as it mostly describes the 
way in which company should communicate with the stock market and shareholders, and the 
nature of events that trigger the responsibility of the company to inform its shareholders, as 
the primary interest of the law is to protect the investors. However, the interesting notions to 
be made are on the fact that the law views the communication between the company and its 
shareholders clearly as one-way communication, where the company is responsible of 
continuously providing the investors with sufficient information about the company’s 
whereabouts. Nothing is said about the upper extent of communication, i.e. there is no upper 
limit on how much the company can communicate with the investors. Also, there are no 
formal requirements of documentation for continuous communication, expect for maintaining 
a library of stock exchange releases and keeping it available to investors at all times.  
The forms of communication with the investors are not limited. Only notion regarding this is 
in Chapter 6 6§, which states that if the company expresses some information to a party - for 
example an individual investor – it should without unnecessary delay issue this information to 
the entire public, given that it is material for the company’s stock price.  
Lastly, the law does not abide the company of informing the public that its assumed future 
prospects regarding a company are totally inconsistent with those of the management. The 
interpretation of the law might necessitate that the market as a whole - e.g. consensus 
forecasts of independent stock analysts - is materially inconsistent with the management’s 
view. This is an important notion regarding the empirical section of this study.   
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4.4.3 Fiva MOK 7/2013, Chapter 5 
Finanssivalvonta is a regulative authority set to protect the rights of insurance holders and 
maintain the atmosphere of general trust and stability in the Finnish financial and insurance 
markets. 95% of its financing comes from the organizations under supervision. 
Finanssivalvonta has the right to issue Rules and Guidelines for the participants of the 
respective markets, and also issue fines if Rules are not abided. The Department of the 
Treasury which is responsible for supervising Finanssivalvonta necessitates that the Rules and 
Guidelines are consistent with those of European Securities and Markets Authority.    
The Rules and Guidelines relevant for this study are found in the Chapter 5 of Määräysten ja 
Ohjeiden Kokoelma (MOK) 7/2013. Largely these elaborate on and give concrete examples 
regarding the contents of Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746, Chapter 7. Guideline (49) 
states an interesting notion, as it says that “If analyst forecasts and estimates differ materially 
from those published by the issuer, Finanssivalvonta recommends that the issuer evaluates the 
cause of this. If the cause turns out to be for example that the issuer has not provided the 
markets sufficient or definite information for the purposes of making reasonable investment 
decisions, issuer may elaborate on the information it has previously given, by either issuing a 
separate release or along with the next interim report.” Although the guideline says nothing 
about the investors overvaluing or undervaluing the company per se – i.e. assuming that over- 
or undervaluation, hype etc. is conditional on the intermediation of the actors in the financial 
markets, rather than being conditional to the information issued by the company itself – it 
does not also forbid the company on commenting the investor sentiment.  
 
4.4.4 Regulations of NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
In addition to the law and implied Rules and Guidelines laid out by Finanssivalvonta, 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki imposes also some supplementary regulations. The motivation of 
these is at least partly due to the fact that Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746, Chapter 6 4§ 
necessitates the market place to inform the market with any material company-related 
information that comes to its knowledge, if it finds out that the company has not done it 
already.  
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The regulations relevant to this study are found in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki “Yhtenäiset 
Tiedottamissäännöt 1.9.2011”, Section 3, and “Arvopaperipörssin säännöt 31.1.2013”, 
Section 3.3. These replicate the contents of the Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746, 
Chapter 7 and Fiva MOK 7/2013, Chapter 5, added with notions and disclaimers on the roles 
and responsibilities of the market place. 
 
5. Empirical treatment 
In this Section I will assess the empirical results based on the interviews conducted by the 
principles introduced in Chapter 3.2 of this study. The empirical treatment is iterative in the 
sense that after the first round of interviews with the present and past CEO’s, CFO’s and IR 
Directors of publicly listed companies  the research questions are revisited before conducting 
interviews with other relevant stakeholders.  
Before initiating the discussion around the research topics, a few notions are to be made. The 
first one is that the most common reaction the first round interviewees had was a slight 
explicit nervousness when asked direct questions about the motivation and purposes of 
company’s IR activities. This manifested most clearly in statements like “I don’t want the 
authorities calling me because I gave this this interview.” and “This is of course a grey area 
we are discussing.” and further confirms the sensitive nature of the topic, and the difficulties 
in obtaining unambiguous data in a systematic manner. However some respondents felt free in 
discussing their practices either directly or indirectly. As I rephrased my questions from 
subjective to passive grammar and asked more indirect questions that would imply some 
practices without the interviewee having to state them directly, I was able to obtain much 
more out of the sessions. The second notion is about the overall tone of voice the investors 
were spoken about. A great deal of the first round interviewees mentioned they felt 
uncomfortable and defensive when meeting investors in public events like the Capital Market 
Day, and on the contrary mentioned that one on one discussions with investors were mostly 
inspirational sessions where they did not have to defend their arguments as aggressively and 
got a lot of good feedback and ideas in return. Regarding the second round of interviews, an 
explicit atmosphere of cautiousness was to be acknowledged especially when interviewing the 
regulatory authorities, but with independent equity analysts this notion was found relaxed.  
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5.1  First round of interviews 
The first round of interviews consisted of six (6) sixty (60) minute one on one sessions with 
present and past CEO’s CFO’s and IR Directors of publicly listed companies. The 
interviewees were picked to represent kinds of situations where the application of law and 
regulations was stressed, like when experiencing a period of very high growth where investor 
sentiment is likely to be toned down for managerial concerns, or experiencing an investment 
period with concurrent short-term losses. Most of the interviewees were ex-CEO’s or ex-
CFO’s. Furthermore, some interviewees were chosen represent the same company to assess 
the static and temporal consistency of IR activities. The idea behind this was that they could 
speak more freely about the topic, given they did not have as much as career concerns and 
could take some distance to their own past performance when assessing it. The intention of 
these interviews was twofold in consisting of a “hard” agenda and a “soft” agenda. The soft 
agenda was to explore the personal fears, motivations and appreciations etc. of allocating time 
to investors. This was much done by encouraging story-telling and free speech of the 
interviewees. Out of these, an initial set of personal level categories for IR conduct emerged. 
 
In addition, regarding the “soft” agenda, I asked the interviewees to engage in telling stories 
about investor seminars, road shows, Capital Market Days and alike events they attended and 
kept asking about how they perceived their importance and usefulness to the company and to 
their own managerial agenda, and kept making notes on things like the tone of voice and the 
attributes the interviewees chose when they told the stories. I also kept urging about any 
informal communication they engaged in with investors.  
 
5.1.1 Hard agenda 
The hard agenda was to ask directly, whether the company had any explicit means to monitor 
the investor sentiment around the company’s stock, and whether they had any explicit means 
of influencing that. Thus, I asked the interviewees the following:   
1. What is time average monthly time you spend/spent with investors? 
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2. Is/was the IR department in your company marketing-oriented or regulatory-oriented? 
3. Do you have an explicit long-term IR strategy? 
4. Do you by e.g. analysing analyst consensus forecasts or otherwise monitor the investor 
sentiment regarding your company? 
5. What explicit communicational means do you use in influencing the investor 
sentiment? 
 
5.1.1.1 Management time spent on IR 
The time spent with investors ranged a lot from half a day a month, given the company 
announced quarterly or annual figures in that month, to multiple days a month.  Two of the 
respondents gave comments in the form of free speech about the very situational nature of IR, 
the other stating that 
“You have to look at IR as a product of its own time and company situation.” 
This gave an idea that the two interviewees thought of IR as a function that lacks a consistent 
strategy of its own, further underlining the impression that IR is thought of as a reactive 
function by the managers.   
 
5.1.1.2 Orientation of IR 
When asked about the orientation of IR department, 4/6 respondents replied it was regulatory-
oriented, and only one interviewee told they have an explicit IR strategy with long-term goals 
regarding e.g. the ownership structure of the company, the other replying that IR strategy had 
no long-term goals other than those derived from the overall strategy of the company. This 
interviewee also told they used stock exchange releases to notify investors about ongoing 
changes in company strategy, in the style of e.g. informing about a major role and briefly 
discussing that it is a major step forward in the implementation of company’s new strategic 
initiatives, or smoothening investor responses to ongoing losses that were due to significant 
investments according to new strategic initiatives. More common responses were reactively-
oriented, as expressed by a statement such as 
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“When the investors in UK and US expressed interest in our company, we had to start 
thinking about engaging with them.” 
Two of the respondents mentioned the companies they run have an explicitly defined IR 
strategy, but only one of these had explicitly long-term goals regarding things like ownership 
structure. 
 
5.1.1.3 Managerial assessment of market 
valuation  
Almost all of the respondents told they took a look on consensus forecasts in periods of times 
before and after the issuance of quarterly or annual earnings reports, but only one of the 
interviewees told they assess these systematically in groups. Also, all of the respondents said 
they kept a close eye on the company’s stock price and liquidity and changes in ownership 
structure, especially after issuing stock exchange releases or hosting investor conferences or 
such events. This seemed more to be a personal feedback gathering method for managers, as 
many interviewees said they assessed this information privately on an ongoing basis, and 
more formally only after issuance of quarterly or annual reports. None of the respondents said 
they had any explicitly defined means to influence the investor sentiment, but practically all 
of them had some personal level comments regarding this. Also, two of the respondents said 
they remembered having had meetings where the implementation of such a practice was 
discussed but neglected. Furthermore, I took note of the fact that practically all of the 
respondents more or less explicitly let understand that they thought such a practice was 
against the regulations. When I asked about any additional comments regarding assessment of 
market valuation, one interviewee told that she was significantly bothered by “hedge funds 
and short sellers” who were targeting to increase the volatility of the company, as she could 
not think of anything to do about it, allowing a hypothesis that the management may also 
place a significant attention on things outside their zone of influence regarding the market 
valuation. 
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5.1.2 Soft agenda 
Regarding the soft agenda, the intention was to gather information that allowed for the 
generation of categories that illustrate the self-interest as of anticipated by agency theory of 
managers when communicating with the investors. It was found out that, although the 
interviewees expressed the companies they run/ran had scarce explicit means of conducting 
IR in addition to its regulatory function, when engaging with investors on a personal level, a 
very wide set of personal level motivations, fears, aspirations, protective measures etc. arose.  
In general, all of the interviewees recognized the IR as an act of selling the company, but 
implied very different views on what’s valid salesmanship, as some chose a very high level of 
professional composure in communicating only the “official” pitch, and some allowed 
themselves more personal disclosure. Also, regarding the general sentiment that underlies 
more subtle forms of communication, almost all of the interviewees explicitly said that 
management is always more optimistic than the investor as they want to believe in the 
strategy and that the investors commonly discount for this factor.  
Although outside the focus of this study, a complementary note from the point of view of 
corporate governance is added. One of the interviewees who had a distinguished background 
in corporate governance summarized the information asymmetry from the perspective of 
governing body by the following quote: 
“Investors react according to their expectations. Overvaluation is as harmful to the company 
as undervaluation. This is because CEO may feel the need to keep up the overvaluation not to 
go under the expectations and lose his or her job. In Company xxx (where interviewee acts as 
Vice Chairman of the Board), we keep a very close eye on possible overvaluation.” (Ex-
CEO). 
The above comment added a valuable side note, although further treatment on the role of the 
corporate governance is omitted. The next chapters introduce empirical findings regarding the 
underlying personal level fears, motivations, aspirations and alike of top management when 
conducting IR, and their practical implications. 
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5.1.2.1 Attitudes towards investors  
The interviewees gave comments which – regarding the attitudes towards investors and 
conduct of IR activities - gave the impression that some played by-the-book and just offered 
the investors with explicitly defined information without any personal influence, and some 
seemed to have engaged in something that was more of a sales mode, placing a lot of 
consideration on their personal influence and their influential aims of communication, also 
allowing also a great deal of personal level motivations to influence the outcomes. The 
previous points were expressed in comments, like  
“You had to very careful when assessing the content of especially negative stock exchange 
releases. If the intention was to tone down the decreasing of stock price before the upcoming 
issuance date of annual reports, one word could make a ton of difference in its impact.” (Ex-
CEO),”  
“It was clear that especially the foreign investors did not understand the company’s business 
model and the market properly, but there was nothing I could do about it. I only kept 
repeating the same value drivers meeting after meeting.” (Ex-CFO).  
“The language I spoke in the US had to be different from the language I spoke to Finnish 
investors. If I was to spoke to US investors similarly as I spoke to Finnish investors, the road 
show would not have succeeded.”  
On the other hand, a very different overall personal stance towards the investors was taken by 
an ex-CFO, who spent a lot of time in telling a long story of a road show he did in US. I got 
the impression that he thought of the occasion as a kind of adventure on a personal level, 
where he felt a lot of freedom in being out there, representing his company to perhaps the first 
significant US shareholders of the company. 
When I brought out the general empirical notion that investors tend to look at too short time 
horizons when assessing companies, and wait results in e.g. potential turnaround stocks too 
soon, all of the interviewees took a passive stance in giving comments like “That’s just the 
way it is.” or “…but there was nothing we could do except keep telling them that we are 
proceeding with the advancements in strategy.”, even though many explicitly or implicitly 
signaled frustration and increased stress levels due to this tendency of the investors. 
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5.1.2.2 Young and old finance professionals 
In general, the interviewees tended to view all public events like road shows, seminars and 
Capital Market Days as stressful events where they had to defend themselves against 
investors who were asking difficult questions. It seemed that the interviewees quickly adapted 
the explicitly defined company story and its core points in those situations. One interviewee 
stated that  
“The first seminar I did in London was an all-day event with back-to-back meetings with 
investors who had made only a little acquaintance to our company. With no time for even to 
eat, I kept repeating the same core points of our strategy over and over again.” (Ex-CEO) 
The notions of age and professional experience kept repeating. Especially the younger 
financial professionals were regarded as aggressive and even unprofessional, as the 
interviewees often got a sense that they relied a lot on their own analysis, and often asked 
very detailed questions about some marginal items in financial reports. To this, one 
interviewee commented that  
“The younger the representative, the less they knew about the business and the more 
aggressive they were with their questions.”  
Another interviewee said that 
“Especially in UK, you can’t be neutral about a stock [as an analyst]. Oftentimes when the 
analyst from London called you could sense that they had already made up their mind about 
being bullish or bearish on our stock, and did call just to get confirmation for their views. 
This was true especially when the caller was a younger analyst.”  
Furthermore, another interviewee commented that 
 “The meetings with senior portfolio managers were often very good [discussions]. I often got 
a lot of perspective to our business from these sessions.”  
, which allows to hypothesize that the senior analysts might use a different set of attributes 
when assessing the non-financial information about a company, striving for discussion rather 
one-way communication of getting answers to predefined questions. 
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5.1.2.3 Direct discussions with individual 
investors  
When asked more explicitly about private discussions with investors, one interviewee 
commented that  
“In the UK for example, it is more common that significant stock owners reserve the right to 
call directly to management and ask how the company is doing.”  
Also, one interviewee told that every now and then they would call some most significant 
analysts following the company, and, without offering any exclusive information, tried to 
make sure the analyst really understood some information regarding the company. This 
manifested in a comment  
“We could not directly tell the analyst that his/her analysis is not on the right track, but we 
could call and discuss the topic in more detail and hope he/she took note accordingly.”  
The same interviewee said they had on a few occasions thought about informing the investors 
at large, but had never done it. It is questionable, should the company inform all investors of 
the information presented or found in private discussions. The difficulty here is that the nature 
of information is not exact, but interpretative and discussion-like as mere conclusions on the 
explicit information given to all investors. If Securities Market Act 14.12.2012/746 and Fiva 
MOK 7/2013, Chapter 5 are interpreted very strictly, the company should reserve the right not 
to engage in any discussions with any individual investor, but only to answer their questions 
according to an internally prepared guidelines document, where the information given to 
investors is explicitly defined. It should be noted though that this kind of behavior is clearly 
contradictory to the ultimate goals of the IR and for the steady development of company’s 
stock price.   
 
5.1.3 Summary of first round interviews 
In order to draw conclusions from the first round of interviews, it seems that most of the 
interviewees didn’t have a very strategic eye on the IR, and took mostly passive and reactive 
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explicit measures when interacting with investors. On the other hand, when attending 
meetings and events, the interviewees’ personal motivations came upfront very clearly. For 
the purposes of generating theory, the following concepts are found to represent the nature of 
personal-level communication and thus the nature of managers’ information set that 
conditions IR activities.  
1. Personal security  
2. Professional composure 
3. Managers’ personal aspirations and motivations in conducting IR 
4. Counterparties’ age/experience/expertise/sensitivity 
5. Differences in analysts’ data acquisition strategies 
6. Influence of investors’ cultural background 
7. Pessimism/optimism towards investors 
8. Marketing/Informing as a stance of IR 
Personal security and professional composure were clearly related to style of communication, 
and expertise the investors approached the management with, as it was found out that the 
interviewees quickly retreated to explicitly defined company story and its core points, when 
having to defend their personal security and professional composure. Also, the conscious 
activity of maintaining optimism about company’s strategy might be related to the necessary 
sensation of being secure and maintaining professional composure. The interviewees who 
expressed a defensive stance towards investors were most often CEO’s, who also tended to 
have a pessimistic view on the investors and chose the style of passive information sharing 
rather than active influence. This CEO-pessimism manifested clearly in comments like “The 
CEO and CFO try to make the numbers so, that EPS is minimally higher than the forecasted 
level. The intention of this is to ensure management can do their work without too many 
questions from the investors.” On the other hand, the interviewees who spoke more about 
inspirational one-on-one discussions with investors or otherwise communicated that they 
mostly felt safe and confident about their professional composure when interacting with 
investors, tended to view investors more optimistically and gave an impression that they 
sought to actively influence them. Investors’ cultural background was also relational to 
interviewees’ optimism/skepticism, as some viewed it as something that gives them more 
freedom to express themselves and even their personal views, while others were distressed 
with proper code of conduct. Lastly, the notion of trade is to be made, as the senior financial 
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professionals, with likely more subject matter expertise about the company’s business, who 
sought to engage in one-on-one discussions with top management, were likely doing that to 
get access to deeper levels of information and a more thorough assessment of top 
management’s characteristics. 
Going back to building blocks of grounded theory, the generation of concepts and 
propositions is omitted at this stage. This is due to the fact that the concepts and categories 
should regard the concrete application of Securities Market Act and its implied regulations, 
not management attitudes towards the application. A reader may note that management 
attitude is actually a category of the application of Securities Market Act, the discussion of 
which is spared for later.   
 
5.2 Second round of interviews 
 The second round of interviews were held with two regulatory authorities of 
Finanssivalvonta, one representative of the Surveillance department of the OMX Nordic 
Helsinki office and three representatives of independent equity market analysts. The intention 
of these interviews was to develop knowledge on the stance these stakeholders placed in the 
idea that company management could and should monitor the investor sentiment more closely 
and comment on overvaluation, undervaluation or liquidity of company’s stock. The possibly 
interesting study of dissonance between management communication and investors’ 
perception about this communication is assessed briefly, but left outside the scope of this 
study. A careful consideration was placed on the notion of these stakeholders viewing such an 
idea as material in their effects and something that the management would more likely either 
use for their own self-interest in pursuit of e.g. career protection or excess compensation, or 
for the benefit of these stakeholders. Also, these stakeholders were assessed before the first 
round of interviews with top management due to the fact that it is likely easier to get 
substantial data out of these interviews by the ability to present some empirical information 
about managerial assessment of the functioning of these groups, although it is acknowledged 
that such a practice might violate the neutral stance towards research, following the guidelines 
for good quality conduct of empirical research. Also, in this round of interviews I embed 
explicitly the questions about company value being created or destroyed by the appliance of 
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regulations on continuous responsibility of informing the investors about the company’s 
whereabouts.  
At this point the questionnaire format adapted is as follows, “A” implying a question 
presented for analysts and “B” implying a question presented for market regulators and/or 
supervisors:  
(the interviewer introduces the theoretical proposition of company value creation by 
reflective IR) 
 
1. How do you see the value of reflective IR in general? Is there any material value 
created in applying such a practice? (A&R) 
 
2. What could be the positive and negative implications of such a practice to effectivity 
of stock markets, if applied more broadly? Would the magnitude of these implications 
be material?  
 
3. If such a practice would gain popularity, would there be any pressure to update 
Finanssivalvonta’s rules and guidelines? 
 
4. Is the current general practice of management in general not assessing the issues like 
price of the company stock ok? 
 
5. How would you assess the nature of this kind of reflective information given some 
company would start to publish it? Would you be compelled to discount its relevance 
as opposed to other sources of information?  
 
6. How do you see the difference between the natures of information about the company 
that analysts are able to produce based on public and private sources, as compared to 
the information that the management possesses?  
 
7. How do you regard management IR communication in general? Is it more often 
optimistic than realistic? By how large a magnitude?  
 
8. Do you think reduced guidance levels are good or bad in general? Would you as an 
analyst/regulator opt for bringing those back in? 
 
9. Do the representatives of company management or IR ever contact you directly? 
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Once again, the interviews are semi-structured, as the interviewees are encouraged to speak 
freely of the topic. The interview questions are to a great degree modified based on the 
findings of the first round of interviews. As the interviewees were once again found to be 
slightly uncomfortable with the use of recorder or the publication of their name in the thesis, I 
decided to agree on the use of pen and paper as a recording format, and to conduct interviews 
anonymously. In practice, the hesitance of interviewees manifested in comments like “It is 
OK for me that you use the recorder, but I might be more careful in the choice of my words if 
this discussion is recorded”, and “I can of course speak more freely about the topic if my 
name is not mentioned in the study.” 
 
5.2.1 Large versus small companies 
As the Finnish stock markets is ”clearly divided to small and large companies”, it was noted 
by all analysts that the material value of reflective IR practices is an entirely different 
question, when addressed from the point of view of either large or small public companies. 
This is because top management’s IR activities are much more informal and direct amongst 
smaller companies, whereas large companies tend to place IR department as a barrier in 
between top management and the investor community. One of the implications of reflective 
IR as stated by analysts were for smaller companies that, should it gain popularity, top 
management would likely outsource the execution of valuation to some external or internal 
third party; an activity that might impose new inefficiencies to the marker although it was to 
reduce those. Also, as small companies often have insufficient analyst following, company’s 
own valuation would easily and likely have too large impacts for the price of stock, and 
would potentially also introduce excessive fluctuation to the course, as liquidity of small 
companies’ stocks is smaller and has a higher standard deviation than that of large companies. 
Furthermore, it was noted by analysts that small companies do not often have CFO’s (or 
CEO’s) who are capable of executing a stock valuation, let alone even understand its 
constituents from theoretical perspective. One analyst also noted that, from theoretical 
perspective, excessive liquidity should always mean under- or overvaluation.  
Large companies were thought by analysts to maybe benefit more of reflective IR practices, 
due to the fact that the first-hand information the top management of large companies 
possesses more seldom reaches sufficient investor audience, and because the top management 
of larger companies is more pressured by the regulators, supervisors and the investor 
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community to stick with the formal and less personal story about the company’s business 
prospects. In this situation, it was speculated that the necessitation for top management’s 
disclosure on the company valuation (most preferably by the CFO) might – as a last resort - 
help stabilize the company’s stock price and reduce market price discovery failures. Also, as 
large companies more often have sufficient analyst following but on the other hand are also 
more prone to the causes of ineffective analyst labor markets, as illustrated in Chapter 4.4., 
reflective IR practices were speculated as instruments that would have a material and positive 
effect for correct market valuation, although the analysts stated that only those CEO’s or 
CFO’s who have a very good personal reputation are able to disagree with an analyst 
consensus, and would take a big risk in doing so.    
   
5.2.2 First impressions about material value of reflective 
IR 
The comments of the regulatory and supervisory bodies (RS) were conservative in the way 
that all three interviewees started commenting on the idea from the perspective of increased 
risks, given the company habitually comments on the valuation. Also, issues like moral 
hazard and managerial overconfidence were regarded as possible threats given management 
agenda would include regular comments about company valuation.  Furthermore, the RS 
bodies pondered whether the investors would be confused in a situation where valuation 
executed by top management differs a lot from that of the markets. In general, the RS bodies 
found it difficult to address the idea that the management would somehow attempt to correct 
the investor sentiment or market price discovery failure, as the regulations should necessitate 
the companies to publish all information necessary for correct valuation. It was although 
acknowledged by RS bodies that in some rare cases e.g. hedge funds seek to cause excessive 
volatility to a stock of a certain company, but even in those situations it might more likely 
than not be more advisable that top management would not interfere with the market 
valuation. These views manifested in comments like:     
“I am against this idea … because it signals that all price sensitive information has not been 
disclosed to the market by the company.”  
“We do not wish the management of companies to introduce such practices.” 
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“It is the market’s job to value the stock.” 
“All price sensitive information should be disclosed in stock market reports. The markets 
should follow signals like purchases of own stock and insider trades in order to address the 
valuation of top management.” 
The first impressions of the analysts were twofold in the sense that one interviewee estimated 
that reflective IR has a modest potential value in correcting the stock price or drawing analyst 
attention to stock, as the markets might not have noticed some events regarding a company’s  
business prospects, and further as this might result in especially lost opportunity costs. One 
interviewee discussed that such reflective IR practices are already to some degree embedded 
to markets, as some top managers have significantly more credibility in the eyes of the 
investors than others, and in rare cases have used that credibility to impact the stock price. All 
analysts regarded top management as seldom being competent for conducting a valuation.  
“I know that some managers have such a trustworthy reputation [in the investors community] 
that they can tilt the price of company’s stock if they want to, without explicitly commenting 
on the market valuation.” 
 “I recall only individual events such as these, especially during the financial crisis ... as a 
kind of last resort. It has a direct effect, if credible managers comment on the valuation.” 
“As most CEO’s come from the operational, not financial, side of the business, they do not 
understand even the basics of valuation.”  
 
5.2.3 Negative and positive implications and material 
value of reflective IR 
The analysts thought of reflective IR as a “distant and operationally complicated” practice as 
a standard procedure, and potentially a cause of excessive market inefficiencies, rather than a 
cure for those, but to possess some material value given it would somehow be executed 
properly. On the other hand, it was thought that the reflective practices could carefully be 
used – preferably indirectly - in extreme cases, but in general management communication 
should be and is to a great degree expected to be more optimistic than realistic. One analyst 
interviewee also commented on the possible negative leadership implications, as one of the 
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top management’s functions and value additions can be thought as that of boosting the effort 
of company personnel. Even in extreme cases – i.e. in cases of significant over- or 
undervaluation – the top management might be “tempted to use reflective practices as a short 
cut for IR, rather than making a more compelling effort to correct the market valuation.” Also, 
the analysts regarded investors being able to well understand the silent messages and inderct 
messages of top management perceptions about market valuation, as companies “seldom draw 
attention and come out to present something to the investors, if they don’t have anything 
positive to tell.”    
The mixed feelings of the analysts manifested in comments like: 
“I recall a case of Uponor’s CEO commenting that they cannot execute any Acquisitions as 
the price of their own stock that the markets will use as a benchmark is so high overvalued 
that the acquisition price would grow too big.” 
 “The attention of the markets should not be drawn from analyst following to management 
following. Especially in smaller companies, the management’s comments would likely gain a 
too large weighting [in investors’ decision making].” 
“Management’s comment can be effectively used to calm down the markets.” 
“In large companies, the management cannot override analyst consensus. They would also 
easily lose credibility if they attempt something like that.” 
RS bodies were found to a certain degree not being aware of the inefficiencies of the analyst 
and investor labor markets as a cause of market price discovery failure, but kept thinking that 
these are a result of insufficient IR practice. This manifested in comments like:   
“If company starts to comment the valuation, the danger is that the company admits that all 
price sensitive information has not been disclosed to the market.” 
“I find it hard to comment on the likely positive implications without seeing one example case 
of this practice beforehand.” 
“The issuance of profit warning is in practice the way to comment the analyst consensus 
regarding the stock price and its future levels.”  
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5.2.4 Management information vs. public information and 
information of the analysts 
The analysts regarded the potential value of first-hand management information as highly 
people dependent, as some managers are thought of as highly credible and trustworthy in the 
eyes of the investors, and some are not. The analysts regarded themselves as focusing more 
on the markets as a whole and on a specific company’s competitors’ position on the markets, 
and oftentimes discount some information that the management seems to think as valuable:  
“For example top prizes in industry fairs that management seems to be proud of are not very 
worthy and interesting, if the macro level of industry is in troubles.” 
“Oftentimes the management does not understand the big picture and might wonder why 
company stock came down on particular day of good news, when at the same day the whole 
market had come down.”   
“On the other hand, sometimes this happens the other way around too. For example, if a tech 
company announces an insignificant partnership, but with a company like Facebook, the 
stock price might gain momentum over nothing.”     
“The longer you have followed a certain top manager, the better you are informed to assess 
his/her communicational style.”  
“In some cases, when the financial report published in the morning was a disappointment 
[and set the price of company stock downhill], the CEO was able to turn the stock price back 
uphill during a conference call in the afternoon, simply because his/her status in the investor 
community is so strong and trustworthy. .. On the other hand, some managers have not been 
able to earn such a reputation and they cannot influence the company’s stock price, even if 
they tried any rhetoric.”  
“Some managers are such that markets believe anything they say, and some are such that 
markets don’t believe anything they say.” 
One analyst explicitly questioned one of the main hypotheses to which this study is founded, 
when answering the question about management information: 
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 “I strongly question the claim that the management would have better information about 
their company’s fair value [than the analysts]; they don’t.” 
 
5.2.5 Present-day IR and level of managerial optimism 
All interviewees agreed that the IR practices as of today have gone to a more conservative 
direction. Some also estimated that this trend will continue as long as the economic growth 
remains stagnant. Managerial optimism was regarded by all interviewees as a natural and 
humane stance towards running a company. These perceptions manifested in comments like:  
“The managers are fairly careful in these days not to say anything [of material value] outside 
press releases.”  
“In general IR has gone to a more passive and careful track since the financial crisis, and 
this track will likely continue.” 
“IR is slightly biased, which can be seen from the fact that negative profit warnings are 
larger in volume than positive ones.” 
“Negative profit warning is sometimes a result of necessary managerial optimism.” 
The analysts stated that management’s conservatism in conducting IR activities is not a good 
thing, but the RS bodies thought present IR practices are mostly ok: 
“If the company follows our rules and guidelines, the present practices are ok.” 
“The top management should not manage the stock price. It is the function of the IR.” 
 
5.2.6 Implications of reduced guidance disclosure 
obligations 
“Managers are always better off to forecast their companies financial than the investors. If 
they are not obliged to issue proper guidance, the stock price will be more volatile.” All three 
analysts interviewed were very clear on the negative effects of reduced guidance obligations, 
and preferred an obligation to issue a range for key financial indicators at the beginning of a 
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financial year, and then be obliged to narrow or review this range in quarterly reports. Also, 
the RS bodies stated that they would prefer such a practice. 
“The increased extremely vague guidance practices of for example stating that business 
landscapes will remain stable during the next year create absolutely no value to investors.” 
All analysts stated explicit criticism against regulatory decisions that have allowed companies 
to omit the issuance of numerical guidance in the form of e.g. Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
forecasts. The logic was that given a company does not issue such forecasts the investor will 
use something much worse as a proxy for these.  The criticism manifested in comments such 
as: 
“Guidance is one of the most effective management tools for impacting the stock price.” 
“Fiva has made a bad favor to the markets by imposing more strict guidance obligations. 
Much poor guidance is due to the fact that manager’s don’t want to argue with Fiva.” 
“The updated guidance obligations have made companies more careful.” 
The RS bodies’ thoughts were mostly aligned with those of the analysts regarding numerical 
guidance and range to be elaborated regarding those, but also noted that some companies 
experience much more difficulties in forecasting these than others. RS bodies also reminded 
that guidance does not eliminate the obligation to issue a profit warning as necessary.  In 
general, the RS bodies also felt that reduction of numerical forecasts in the form of ranges to 
be elaborated during the financial year is a bad thing and makes markets more ineffective. 
This was explicitly stated by the below comment:  
“We feel that exact numerical guidance would best serve the investors. … Issuing guidance is 
an act of balancing that the company may decide themselves.”  
Also one interviewee noted that the update on guidance issuance obligations was simply an 
act of harmonizing domestic regulation with that of the EU, and should have only a marginal 
effect to the effectivity of the financial markets. 
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5.2.7 Direct communication in between top management 
and analysts 
The analysts regarded private discussions in between top management and IR as a natural and 
persistent part of their agenda of valuing companies. The analysts also commented that, in 
general the IR and top management approaches them in a very collaborative style or may even 
ask analysts to educate company management by presenting and discussing their work with 
them. These perceptions manifested in comments like:  
“It is normal that analysts seek to create relationships with company management to gain 
competitive edge over other analysts.” 
“It is regular and ok that company representatives and IR contact analysts regarding 
valuation. Most often they just want to hear the logic you followed.” 
“Sometimes analysts are used as a sparring partner for management, especially in smaller 
companies.”  
“Larger companies seek to reduce the spread of consensus. IR can contact you if your 
forecast deviates from consensus largely. It is their job.” 
“In general, the management and IR well respects analyst’s publications.”  
“Right valuation is in the interest of all market participants.” 
The analysts reported only a few cases where their views were directly attacked, or cases 
where company IR or management made explicit effort in trying to impact the analyst’s 
valuation: 
“It is very rare that top management or IR call directly and criticize published reports. In 
rare cases, some larger companies have attacked against analyst reports and tried to argue 
against them.” 
“[IR department of company XXX] for example, when we once took a stance about their 
dividends, sent a direct invitation for a conference call ... where the intention clearly was to 
try and educate us to change our views to be more aligned with those of their own.” 
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“I have sometimes been told [by representatives of the IR] that my notions were corrects, but 
we don’t agree on the conclusions.” 
“I have heard that some IR’s have sometimes invited analysts for lunches to e.g. go through a 
specific investment case.”   
 
5.2.8 Summary of second round interviews 
The preliminary research question was to discuss reflective IR practices among Finnish public 
listed companies. It was found in the first round of interviews that the managers balance in 
between the official company story and their personal aspirations, motives and assertions 
when conducting IR, and were found to choose a more formal approach to protect their 
professional composure and personal security as necessary. In this section, the findings from 
the second round of interviews are reflected back to the preliminary research question and to 
findings from the first round of interviews. In order to draw conclusions from the second 
round of interviews and to formulate a selective third phase for the data gathering process, the 
following concepts were found emerging from the data, given the idea that top management 
of a publicly listed company was obliged to maintain and communicate a valuation of their 
own: 
1. Management unprofessionalism with regards to valuation.  
2. Existence of proxies for communicating the management’s valuation indirectly 
3. Expectations of excessive fluctuation to company’s stock price 
4. Collaboration of stakeholders in maintaining “correct” market valuation 
5. Analyst criticism towards updated guidance regulations 
6. Management conservatism regarding IR in general 
7. The weighting of company-specific information and industry & macroeconomic 
information in valuation 
All interviewees, and analysts more clearly than RS bodies, questioned management’s 
competence in understanding equity valuation. Although all interviewees acknowledged that 
management knows more about the company-specific business prospects than the markets in 
general, the company was thought as not having an ability to address this information 
properly in order to conduct a valuation of their own that would materially supplement the 
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valuations of independent equity analysts. Thus the idea of management commenting on the 
market valuation was not very much welcomed. Also, all interviewees estimated that the 
markets are well equipped to follow and understand the indirect signals of top management’s 
valuation, like the purchase of own stock or changes in the insiders’ ownership. Also, the 
general feel amongst the interviewees was that if management starts to comment on the 
market valuation, it may mislead and confuse the investor, especially with regards to smaller 
companies. Furthermore, such a practice may negatively affect the management agenda, as 
managers may start to manage the stock price instead of managing the company, as the 
analyst felt that they to some vague degree already do that. Even further, the people dependent 
nature of top management IR might, given reflective practices were introduced to the 
management agenda at large, make top management labor market more ineffective, as some 
managers would be hired to e.g. buff the market value of company equity. All interviewees, 
including the top management representatives from the first round, more or less clearly 
acknowledged that a justified market valuation and minimal fluctuations to market value is in 
the best interest of everyone. Analysts were found to express explicit criticism for the updated 
guidance regulations, which have along with the general stagnant economic development 
made managers very careful in their IR communication. None of the interviewees expressed 
their recommendations for top management to start habitually issuing comments (in the form 
stock market releases) about market valuation. Relationship building and discussions with the 
top management and IR was found to be a result of the competitive analyst labor market.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this section, all gathered and analysed data is found to present constituents for generation 
of theoretical propositions about top management’s conduct of IR and, in particular, for the 
lack of reflective practices in it. Thus, a generation of theoretical propositions as per top level 
abstractions emergent from the data are presented. Following that, the main research motif is 
revisited, and the economic and academic implications of generated propositions are 
discussed. The reader should take careful note that the economic implications are discussed in 
the fashion of the generated propositions’ ability to fulfil the requirements for sound grounded 
theory – enabling the prediction of social behaviour etc. etc. - as illustrated in Chapter 3.2  
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6.1 Generation of propositions 
The primary motif of this research was to study a question  
What factors constitute the absence of reflective IR practices among Finnish publicly listed 
companies? 
The study was initiated by a set of auxiliary research questions regarding the practical nature 
of IR function, information set of top management, regulatory pressures and alike, as 
illustrated in Chapter 2. 
As per the primary means of studying this topic was chosen to be the generation of theoretical 
propositions as found emergent from data and following the principles of grounded theory 
generation, this chapter presents a set of top level abstractions in the form of arguable 
propositions of all data gathered and analyzed in this study, as laid out in Chapter 5. The 
propositions are then reflected to relevant existing theory and previous academic studies, and 
their economic implications discussed in the following subchapters. Also, the limitations of 
this study and its contributions are stated and discussed.  
The constituents for the absence of reflective IR practices can be categorized to originate from 
the following abstract entities: 
1. Professional specialization and labor markets of the managers 
2. Professional specialization and labor markets of the equity analysts 
3. Professional specialization and the labor markets of regulatory authorities 
From these constituents – as per the primary means of approaching the research motif was the 
generation of grounded theory – a following set of top level abstractions are found emergent 
from the data 
Proposition 1: In conducting IR activities, representatives of top management balance in 
between strict professional composure and personal exposure. 
Proposition 1.1: Managers emphasize professional composure in public events 
and in communication with younger and/or less experienced equity analysts, 
and vice versa 
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Proposition 1.2 Personal sensation of security is negatively correlated with the 
emphasis of professional composure 
Proposition 1.3: Regarding communicational means with top management, 
equity analysts have differing strategies of information acquisition. More senior 
and/or experienced analysts more often seek to engage in two-way private 
communication, as younger and/or less experienced equity analysts emphasize 
public one-way communication. 
Proposition 1.4: Regarding communicational means with top management, 
regulatory authorities most often engage in one-way communication of advisory 
nature. 
As quoted and discussed in Chapter 5.1.2, the managers had very differing personal 
motivations, fears and aspirations regarding the conduct of IR. The clearest common factor 
among these was the implied balancing in between a strict professional composure and a 
formal conduct, and personally motivated, even free-spirited agenda which became apparent 
in situations where the management felt secure on a personal level.  
Proposition 2: The value addition of IR activities experienced a negative shock by the 
regulatory updates regarding obligations to issue guidance. 
As introduced in Chapter 5, the interviewees from top management and equity analysis 
profession explicitly criticized the recent regulatory updates regarding obligations to issue 
guidance. Top management stated that they have increased arbitrary carefulness and 
decreased the magnitude of IR communication due to recent regulatory updates regarding 
guidance issuance, and analysts confirmed they have also observed such a phenomenon. 
Proposition 3: Top management, regulatory authorities and equity analysts are satisfied with 
the existence of incentive misalignment in between people responsible of running a company, 
and the people responsible of maintaining a valuation of the company’s equity.  
Proposition 3.1: The risks of narrowing the aforementioned incentive 
misalignment by explicit IR activities of top management addressed in this study 
are probably larger than the possible gains. 
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Proposition 3.2: The equity analysts and IR departments of large public 
companies are found to exhibit a subtle, collaborative information system, the 
motives of its existence being the correct market valuation of respective 
company’s equity. 
Proposition 3 underlines the notions that none of the interviewees expressed much interest 
towards reflective IR activities, the management being reluctant and implying increased stress 
levels as a response to such obligation, and other interviewees outweighing the risks to gains. 
The many times aforementioned incentive misalignment is thus of highly persistent nature, 
and not to change without e.g. regulatory shocks, which are not expected to happen.    
Proposition 4: Representatives of top management of publicly listed companies maintain a 
personal valuation, and engage at varying degrees in more subtle forms of communication 
with financial community to ease the personal distress caused by the differences of this 
personal valuation and market valuation, although not willing to directly and systematically 
comment on the market valuation. 
Proposition 4.1: Representatives of top management of publicly listed 
companies are discouraged by the regulatory authorities to engage in such 
activities 
Proposition 4.2: The members of the Finnish investor community account 
significantly for the personal credibility of a member of top management of a 
publicly listed company. This personal credibility more significantly than means 
or intended effects of communication accounts for the market valuation effects 
of IR activities  
Proposition 4 argues that although none of the managers expressed interest towards reflective 
IR practices and responded that they didn’t systematically use any, they much regarded the 
changes in market valuation. All of the interviewees implied they felt pressured to varying 
degrees by regulatory authorities. The interviewees with the analysts offered further support 
for the managers’ tendency to protect their reputability in the eyes of the financial 
community. 
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6.2 Constituents for the lack of reflective IR practices 
Propositions 1…4 and their siblings constitute an overall illustration of the landscape for the 
lack of reflective IR practices amongst Finnish publicly listed companies. From these 
propositions, four main factors are found emergent as main constituents 
1. The top management of a publicly listed company lacks on average professionalism 
regarding valuation and regulatory treatment of a public company’s equity 
2. The top management’s attitudes towards regulatory authorities and recent regulatory 
updates significantly discourage any proactively oriented IR activities 
3. The equity analysis profession is able to satisfy the investor community regarding the 
information asymmetry arising from the incentive misalignment in between the 
representatives  of top management and investors 
4. The representatives of the top management of Finnish publicly listed companies aim 
to develop long term credibility in the eyes of the investor community and their 
respective shareholders, and are reluctant to risk this asset. 
 
6.3 Economic implications of propositions 
The set of constituents found emergent from top level abstractions of the research data are 
found to illustrate characteristics of a small economy with stiff labor markets. As the 
existence of the aforementioned incentive misalignment was widely acknowledged amongst 
investors and of being of significant magnitude, it is likely to exhibit a persistent market price 
discovery failure. However, the direct and explicit means introduced for the accountancy of 
this gap were evaluated as containing more potential risks than gains, and the interviewed 
members of the top management were also reluctant to engage in them.  
The existence of incentive misalignment addressed in this study was found to provide a 
significant stimuli for the competitiveness of analyst labor markets, as analysts were found to 
engage in differing strategies of information acquisition for competitive advantage and career 
progression. Yet, as these differing information acquisition strategies and more subtle forms 
of communication implied by them present also an information system that is somewhere in 
between private and public information, it may also add to the persistent phenomenon of 
market price discovery failure.  
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Furthermore, as members of the top management profession were regarded as not capable of 
maintaining a professionally sound market valuation or even understanding its constituents, it 
implies a very specific business branch originating from the informational needs of the 
investors interested in small cap stocks of the Finnish stock market. This branch was found to 
exist in the Finnish stock market, and be likely correlated with the relative size and growth of 
the small cap stocks of the Finnish stock market.  
 
6.4 Generated propositions and previous research 
Regarding the intentions of this study, the scarce relevant previous academic research was 
found in the fields of managerial research on agency theory and of herding and labor markets 
of the analysts. The empirical assessment was found to contribute to both fields of research. 
Regarding agency theory, the empirical assessment provided support for it offering a valid set 
of theoretical notions to act as a basis for managerial research, as managers were found to 
occupy a personal agenda alongside serving the best interests of respective shareholders, even 
in a highly regulated and supervised function such as IR of publicly listed company. It was 
anticipated that functions like IR and regulatory authorities are empirically found to verify the 
theoretical expectations for the motives of their existence, as per Proposition 2 of Chapter 4.2. 
However, conducted empirical assessment was not found to provide feedback for this 
proposition, as IR departments were found to be more collaborative with the analyst 
community - being responsible of maintaining a valuation of a company’s equity - than 
anticipated, and not placing much emphasis on the supervisory tasks regarding the activities  
of the top management. Also, the influence of regulatory authorities in their aims to increase 
transparency was found not provide support for Proposition 2 of Chapter 4.2., as their actions 
tended to make top management more passive, instead of facilitating to align the interests of 
investors and top management.  The empirical assessment of Proposition 1 of Chapter 4.2 was 
restricted outside the scope of this study. Also the role of corporate governance was restricted 
outside the scope of this study.  
Regarding herding and other imperfections of the analyst labor market as introduced in 
Chapter 4.4 and its subchapters, this study contributed to existing theory by finding the 
existence of varying information acquisition strategies the analyst profession exhibits. As 
previous research on this field has also been almost exclusively quantitative and data-
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intensive in nature, the empirical assessment conducted in this study was found to enrich the 
present methodological toolkit of this field of research, and in the field of financial studies in 
general.    
As per modern academic look on IR as a strategic function introduced in Chapter 4.2.1, the 
empirical assessment conducted in this study offered very scarce empirical support from the 
Finnish stock market, as the managers and all other interviewees explicitly treated IR as a 
reactive function of the corporate landscape. On the other hand, although not being strategic 
in nature, it was found to exhibit a collaborative character - especially amongst large publicly 
listed companies - in communication with the analysts, as analysts were found even to 
educate members of the IR department. 
     
6.5 Limitations of the study 
As stated numerous times throughout the study, the choice of grounded theory generation as 
the research method introduced in itself a number of limitations for the study. From these, the 
following are found most relevant: 
1. Previous research by grounded theory generation is to my best knowledge non-
existent amongst financial studies. Thus no best practices and practices or practical 
considerations were found exhibited.  
2. Grounded theory is most often quoted as an advanced research method not suitable for 
inexperienced researchers, being somewhat contradictory to the average academic 
experience of Master’s thesis writer. 
The argued limitations can be reflected on the theoretical density regarding the iterative 
process of data analysis, gathering and abstraction, i.e. the primary vehicles of grounded 
theory research conduct. Density was first used by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as a term to 
illustrate the overall quality of research conduct and the arising generated theory. It refers to 
the researcher ability to exhaust qualitative data by analysis, to make choices regarding 
theoretical sampling in data gathering, and to craft transparent and exhaustive abstract classes 
of concepts, categories and propositions from slices of data – the constituents of grounded 
theory, as introduced in Chapter 3.2. In addition to density, the researcher’s ability to maintain 
a neutral stance in the conduct of research can be argued, as per the semi-structured interview 
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format and the sensitive nature of the research topic. Furthermore, the limitations of the 
sample size can be argued to propose limitations to the consistency of the results of this study, 
as the interviewees arguably suffer from varying degrees of personal bias when addressing the 
highly abstract research topic. For example, in some cases, even after repeating the same 
question, an interviewee might had had difficulties in focusing his/her answer.   
 
6.6 Implications for further research 
The main implications of this study refer to the generalization of some results of this study, as 
they might suffer from varying degrees of personal bias of the interviewees. For example, an 
interview study regarding the practitioners’ assessment of the regulatory updates might be 
conducted to account for and omit the magnitude of personal bias of the interviewees 
interviewed in the conduct of this study. Further, as the informational gap in between the top 
management and the independent equity analysts was acknowledged and of being of 
significant magnitude by all interviewees, and as the reflective IR practices addressed in this 
study were found as inadequate means to narrow this gap as they were evaluated to propose of 
more risks than gains, more practically oriented empirical research on the means of narrowing 
this gap is proposed. Furthermore, as grounded theory - being a very distinguished research 
practice in general - is practically non-existent in the field of academic financial studies and 
the methodological toolkit of financial studies is found very narrow in general, an addition of 
qualitative means of research to this field is encouraged in future studies.    
As per the research questions were found of being of profoundly different nature regarding 
the size - as the Finnish stock market is clearly divided by turnover to small and large 
companies  - of companies addressed, more extensive research on the collaborative system of 
IR departments of large publicly listed companies and independent equity analysts might offer 
some practical cues for ideas of narrowing the aforementioned incentive misalignment, and to 
provide interesting insights on different data acquisition strategies analysts use with larger 
companies, with which it is more difficult for analysts to communicate directly with top 
management. Also, a more detailed study on the differing information acquisition strategies of 
the analysts would likely be more fertile in the small cap segment of a stock market, as some 
of these companies might not have even one full time employee responsible of IR. 
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Future research might also widen the scope of this study by modifying the research questions 
to take account the investors’ informational needs and concerns of residual loss introduced in 
Chapter 4.1. This group of stakeholders was restricted outside the scope of this study by the 
fact that this study was both methodologically and topically a pioneering research in its field, 
but they should be addressed in future research as “end customers” of IR.  
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